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Introduction
OnJuly 11, 1989, Hoylake Investments Limited ("Hoylake") announced
a hostile tender offer for British American Industries (BAT).' Because
BAT is a British corporation whose shares are sold on the London Stock
Exchange, British regulations governed the Hoylake bid.2 Nevertheless,
because BAT ultimately controlled insurance companies doing business
in nine American states,3 Hoylake could not tender a bid without the
approval of the insurance commissioners in the nine states.4 Whereas
British regulations required the completion of a tender offer within a
rigid time frame,5 the state regulations called for much lengthier pro-
ceedings. 6 Thus, compliance with both British and American regula-
tions was impossible. Consequently, the application of United States
law seriously threatened the Hoylake offer.7
Hoylake attacked the conflict on both sides of the Atlantic, seeking
injunctions in all nine states to bar application of the statutes and
appealing to the British Panel on Takeovers and Mergers (the "Take-
1. Hoylake Inv. Ltd. v. Bell, 723 F. Supp. 576, 577 (D. Kan. 1989); see also The
Times (London), July 12, 1989, at 1, col. 1.
2. Bell, 723 F. Supp. at 577; see also PANEL ON TAKE-OVERS AND MERGERS, THE
CrrY CODE ON TAKE-OVERS AND MERGERS A3 (1985) [hereinafter Crry CODE] (Rules
for mergers and takeovers of corporations whose shares are sold on the London
Stock Exchange).
3. Decision of the Panel on Takeovers and Mergers, B.A.T. Industries p.l.c., at 4
(Aug. 15, 1989) [hereinafter Takeover Panel]. The nine states are Arizona, Califor-
nia, Idaho, Illinois, Kansas, Ohio, Oregon, Texas, and Washington.
4. Id.; see KAN. STAT. ANN. § 40-3304 (Supp. 1989); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 20-
481.02 (1990); IDAHO CODE § 41-3802 (1990); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 73, para. 743.12(a)
(1988); OR. REv. STAT. § 732.523 (1989); WASH. REV. CODE § 48.31.010 (1990).
5. Within 60 days of making the offer, the offer must be accepted by 51%o of the
target company's shareholders, otherwise it expires and cannot be renewed for 12
months. See infra notes 34-39 and accompanying text.
6. See Takeover Panel, supra note 3, at 5. The state regulatory procedures may
be long and "nearly as onerous as litigation." Id. The Commissioner's decisions are
reviewable by courts. See infra notes 64-70 and accompanying text.
7. As a practical matter, applying U.S. law greatly diminished the chances of a
successful offer. See infra notes 103-06 and accompanying text.
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over Panel"). Each of the nine states denied Hoylake's motion for a pre-
liminary injunction,8 but the British Takeover Panel granted Hoylake an
unprecedented waiver of the timetable. 9
This Note argues that the analysis employed by the U.S. courts in
denying Hoylake relief from state insurance laws was overly simplistic in
failing to consider Britain's interest in regulating takeover battles involv-
ing primarily British companies. Although the McCarran-Ferguson
Act 10 authorizes states to regulate "the business of insurance," I 1 its use
to authorize regulation of a predominantly foreign takeover battle was
highly questionable. If, instead of waiving the strict time limits, the
Takeover Panel had approved Hoylake's offer, the states would have
been hard-pressed to enforce a contrary ruling on Hoylake's proposed
acquisition.
Section I of this Note presents the facts of the Hoylake tender offer
and describes the interaction between the British City Code and the
state insurance holding company statutes. Section I also discusses the
U.S. district court decisions denying Hoylake injunctive relief. Section
II then considers as an analogue U.S. antitrust law and the balancing test
courts have used in tempering the application of that law to transactions
occurring outside the U.S. Section III first critiques the district courts'
failure to consider the international interests at stake. Next, section III
explores the possible repercussion of the decisions on future cases
involving acquisitions with even less impact on the U.S. than in the Hoy-
lake scenario and concludes that the application of U.S. insurance law in
such cases would be both unreasonable and unenforceable. Section III
then applies to the Hoylake facts the balancing test borrowed from anti-
trust law, which is also found in the Restatement of U.S. Foreign Rela-
tions Law ("Restatement"). Finally, section III considers possible
legislative responses to the Hoylake problem. This Note concludes that,
although application of U.S. law arguably was reasonable in the Hoylake
context, the strict application of state insurance regulations is an
unworkably simplistic solution to a complex problem of international
law.
I. Background
This section sets the background of Hoylake's tender offer for BAT and
contrasts the British regulatory scheme for mergers with the U.S. state
scheme for regulating insurance companies. The British Takeover
8. See Bell, 723 F. Supp. at 576; Hoylake Inv. Ltd. v. Washburn, 723 F. Supp. 42
(N.D. Ill. 1989); Hoylake Inv. Ltd. v. Gallinger, 722 F. Supp. 573 (D. Ariz. 1989).
The other decisions are unpublished, but all went against Hoylake and denied the
injunction.
9. Takeover Panel, supra note 3. On September 29, 1989, the decision was
affirmed by the Panel. See The Times (London), Sept. 30, 1984, at 17, col. 4.
10. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-15 (1988). For the text of the McCarran-Ferguson Act, see
infra note 42 and text accompanying note 43.
11. 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b) (1988).
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Panel ultimately compromised important policy concerns to prevent
U.S. laws from killing a bid within Britain's jurisdiction. The U.S. dis-
trict courts made no concession to the British policy interests at stake
and authorized the states to apply their insurance laws to Hoylake's bid.
A. The Offer and the Players
BAT is a multinational conglomerate incorporated in Britain and doing
business in ninety countries. 12 Its assets, totaling 9.9 billion pounds, are
concentrated in tobacco, paper, retailing, and finance. 13 In 1988 alone
BAT's earnings exceeded $28 billion.' 4 BATUS, BAT's subsidiary in
the U.S., owns Farmers Group, Inc. ("Farmers"), which controls three
insurance exchanges doing business in the U.S. 15 The profits from
Farmers comprise but a minuscule portion of BAT's total earnings.'
6
SirJames Goldsmith, along withJacob Rothschild and Kerry Packer,
created Hoylake for the purpose of acquiring BAT.' 7 The hostile
tender offer of 13.9 billion pounds ($21 billion) would have netted
BAT's shareholders $4 billion above the pre-offer value of the stock.' 8
The proposal thus became the largest tender offer made to date in
Europe. The deal was also novel in British annals for its heavy leverag-
ing. Because Hoylake's offer was partially financed with "junk bonds,' 9
British financial commentators criticized the proposal.
20
The chances of Hoylake making a successful tender offer were sig-
nificantly weakened because of the collapse of Drexel, Burnham & Lam-
bert and a growing global wariness of junk bonds. Hoylake, not
surprisingly, restructured its offer to include mostly cash. 2 ' Soon after
the first of the nine state insurance commissioners denied Hoylake's bid,
Hoylake completely abandoned its tender offer.
22
B. British Takeover Regulation
Because all of BAT's stock is traded on the London Stock Exchange,
Britain's City Code on Takeovers and Mergers ("City Code") governed
12. Brief for Hoylake Investments Limited at 8, Hoylake Inv. Ltd. v. Washburn,
723 F. Supp. 42 (N.D. Ill. 1989) (No. 89-C-5822) [hereinafter Hoylake Brief].
13. Bell, 723 F. Supp. at 577.
14. Hoylake Brief, supra note 12, at 10.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. The Times (London), July 12, 1989, at 1, col. 1.
18. Bell, 723 F. Supp. at 577.
19. Hoylake Brief, supra note 12, at 4; see also The Times (London), July 15, 1989
at 19, col. 2.
20. See, e.g., The Times (London), July 15, 1989, at 19, col 2. British fears may
have been vindicated by the liquidation of the investment bank Drexel, Burnham &
Lambert. Drexel, a leading source ofjunk bonds, would have partially financed the
Hoylake deal. See Wall St.J., Feb. 20, 1990, at Bl1, col. 2.
21. Wall St.J., Feb. 20, 1990, at B11, col. 2. Due to the increased expenses for
Hoylake-over 100 million pounds in underwriting fees-London market experts
felt the chances for a successful bid were slim. Id. (statement of Michael Pacitti, a
London analyst for Merrill Lynch & Co.).
22. See Hoylake Abandons BAT Bid, Fin. Times, Apr. 24, 1990, at 1, col. 1.
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the Hoylake bid.23 The Takeover Panel promulgates and administers
the City Code.24 Although the City Code is not statutory and "has not,
and does not seek to have, the force of law,"'2 5 the Takeover Panel may
exclude a firm from the securities markets in the United Kingdom for
failure to comply with the City Code. 26 Thus, although the City Code
depends on voluntary compliance, the practical sanction available virtu-
ally guarantees such compliance.
The Takeover Panel acts as a quasi-judicial board, and in appropri-
ate circumstances an Appeal Committee reviews its decisions.2 7 Ulti-
mately the British courts may review decisions of the Takeover Panel.28
At the behest of the Secretary of Trade, the Government Monopolies
and Mergers Commission may intervene at any point.2 9
The City Code exists to protect the interests of target companies'
shareholders. 30 The City Code, therefore, makes every effort to give the
relevant decision-making power to shareholders. 3 1 Among the "Gen-
eral Principles" prefacing the City Code: an offeror must treat all share-
holders of the same class of a target company similarly; both offeror and
target must provide sufficient information and advice to enable share-
holders to reach a proper decision; and, after an offer has been made,
the board of the target company may not make defensive maneuvers
which might frustrate the offer or deprive the shareholders of the oppor-
tunity to decide on the merits of the offer without the consent of the
shareholders. 32 Thus, the shareholders' right to make an informed
decision on the merits of the tender offer is of paramount importance
under the City Code.
The ban on "frustrating actions" is central to the British regulatory
scheme and its promotion of shareholder control. Target boards are
prohibited from unilaterally instituting takeover defenses, a strategy
23. Crry CODE, supra note 2, at A3.
24. The Takeover Panel includes members of the London Stock Exchange and
the British banking, investment, and insurance industries. Id. at Al. The Panel was
created by the London Stock Exchange, the Bank of England, and private financial
institutions. Id.
25. Id. at A2.
26. See DeMott, Current Issues in Tender Offer Regulation: Lessons from the British, 58
N.Y.U. L. REv. 945, 947-48 (1983). The Panel relies largely on the power of adverse
publicity and may even recommend that the Stock Exchange delist a company. Id.
27. Crry CODE, supra note 2, at A5.
28. Regina v. Panel on Take-overs and Mergers, exparte Datafin p.l.c., 1 Q.B. 815
(Ct. App. 1986).
29. The Mergers and Monopolies Commission (MMC) polices proposed mergers
and acquisitions to prevent the creation of monopolies that lessen competition within
British markets. The MMC intervenes to investigate proposed deals when the Trade
Secretary so demands. Unlike the Takeover Panel which administers the City Code,
the MMC is a statutory body. See The Times (London), Sept. 22, 1989, at 21, col. 8
(Trade Secretary refused to initiate an inquiry of the Hoylake bid because the propo-
sal did not affect competition).
30. See generally DeMott, supra note 26, at 959-65.
31. Epstein, Takeover Panel Regains Control in B.A.T. Ruling, N.Y. LJ., Dec. 4, 1989,
at 46.
32. Crry CODE, supra note 2, at Cl-2.
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which is commonplace in the U.S. 38 Indeed, shareholders must accept
or reject the tender offer on its merits.
Another policy of the City Code is to avoid drawn-out takeover bat-
tles which are destructive to the target company and detrimental to its
shareholders. Because companies should concern themselves with pro-
duction rather than legal maneuvering, the City Code establishes a rigid
time frame and keeps the involvement of lawyers to a minimum.3 4 The
announcement of a "firm intention" to make an offer commences a take-
over bid.3 5 The offeror must mail an offer to the shareholders within
twenty-eight days of this announcement.3 6 If the offeror does not
achieve a fifty-one percent acceptance rate from the shareholders of the
target company within sixty days of the mailing, the offer expires.37 An
expired offer may not be renewed for twelve months.38 This rigid time
frame further limits the options available to the target board, thus
enhancing the value of the offer to the shareholders. Prior to the Take-
over Panel's BAT ruling, the Panel only granted exceptions to the twelve
month mandatory lapse period under very limited circumstances. 3 9
In the Hoylake bid, the application of the U.S. insurance holding
company statutes frustrated important British policies. Specifically,
those statutes diluted the shareholders' decision-making authority and
precluded a quick resolution of the tender offer. Because the state
insurance commissioners delayed ruling on Hoylake's offer, BAT was
able to engage in precisely the defensive maneuvering prohibited by the
City Code. If any state commissioner denied Hoylake approval of its
offer, the BAT shareholders would never have had the chance to decide
upon the offer on its merits. Even if all nine states had eventually
approved the offer, BAT's frustrating actions may still have deprived its
shareholders of the opportunity to review the offer on its merits. In
order to maintain some control over its own regulatory system, the Brit-
ish Takeover Panel was forced to waive the twelve month lapse period,
33. For example, a target board in Britain may not implement a "poison pill,"
recapitalize, or sell off the firm's assets without the approval of its shareholders.
Epstein, supra note 31, at 46.
34. See, e.g., Crrv CODE, supra note 2, at A6 (it is not the Panel's normal practice to
allow full representation by legal advocates); see also id. at A3.
35. L at D6 (Rule 2.5).
36. Id. at MI (Rule 30), F10 (Rule 9.3(a)).
37. Id. at M4 (Rule 31.6).
38. Id. at NI (Rule 35.1).
39. Dispensation of the 12-month freeze period will be granted when:
(a) The new offer is recommended by the board of the offeree company...,
or (b) the new offer follows the announcement of an offer by a third party for
the offeree company; or (c) the previous offer lapsed on a reference to the
Monopolies and Mergers Commission and the new offer follows the giving of
clearance. Any such offer must normally be announced within 21 days after
the announcement of such clearance.
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thus compromising the time frame so crucial to its regulatory regime.40
As a result, the application of U.S. insurance law completely frustrated
British regulatory concerns.
C. The McCarran-Ferguson Act and the State Insurance Holding
Company Statutes
In 1945, Congress passed the McCarran-Ferguson Act (the "Act"), 4 1
which declares that state regulation of insurance is in the public inter-
est.4 2 Further, the Act provides in relevant part:
(a) State regulation. The business of insurance, and every person
engaged therein, shall be subject to the laws of the several States which
relate to the regulation or taxation of such business.
(b) Federal regulation. No Act of Congress shall be construed to invali-
date, impair, or supersede any law enacted by any State for the purpose of
regulating the business of insurance, or which imposes a fee or tax upon
such business, unless such Act specifically relates to the business of
insurance.43
In interpreting this Act, the Supreme Court set out a broad test for
determining what qualifies as "the business of insurance" in S.E.C. v.
National Securities.4 4 The Act authorizes states to regulate "activities of
insurance companies [that] relate so closely to their status as reliable
insurers that they.., must be placed in the same class [as the business of
insurance]." '4 5 Under this test, the Court has held the fixing of rates,4 6
the sale and advertising of policies,4 7 and the licensing of companies
and their agents48 all to be the "business of insurance." In construing
the Act broadly, the Court has authorized a wide range of state
regulations.
40. See Epstein. supra note 31, at 46. "As a result of the B.A.T. decision, foreign
takeover battles will still be fought in U.S. courts and regulatory agencies, but they
are less likely to be decided here." Id.
41. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-15 (1988). The Act was passed in response to United
States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Assoc., 322 U.S. 533 (1944), in which the court
held that insurance transactions were commerce for purposes of the federal com-
merce clause, thus removing from the several states regulatory power over the insur-
ance industry. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. South-Eastern Underwriters reversed
Paul v. Virginia, 8 Wall. 168 (1868), in which the court had held that "[i]ssuing a
policy of insurance is not a transaction of commerce." Id. at 183.
42. The Act states:
Congress hereby declares that the continued regulation and taxation by the
several States of the business of insurance is in the public interest, and that
silence on the part of the Congress shall not be construed to impose any
barrier to the regulation or taxation of such business by the several States.
15 U.S.C. § 1011 (1988).
43. Id. at § 1012.
44. SEC v. National Sec., 393 U.S. 453 (1969).
45. Id. at 460.
46. Id.
47. FTC v. National Casualty Co., 357 U.S. 560 (1958).
48. Robertson v. California, 328 U.S. 440 (1946).
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In National Securities, the Supreme Court also indicated that the
McCarran-Ferguson Act authorized regulation of a merger involving
insurance companies. Addressing an Arizona regulation, the Court
noted that the statute "requires the State Director of Insurance to find
that the proposed merger would not 'substantially reduce the security of
and service to be rendered to policyholders' before he gives his
approval. This section of the statute clearly relates to the business of
insurance." 49 The Court, therefore, implicitly recognized that mergers
may result in the liquidation or underfinancing of the insurer. Either
result would jeopardize the position of policyholders. Thus the McCar-
ran-Ferguson Act, as a matter of federalism, authorizes state regulation
of mergers involving insurance companies to protect the policyholders'
interests.
1. State Insurance Holding Company Statutes
All fifty states promulgated insurance holding company statutes in the
1960s, when "insurance companies joined general business corpora-
tions in a move toward increased mergers and formation of holding
companies." 5 0 The nine states involved in the Hoylake bid, like most
states, base their insurance holding company legislation upon the
National Association of Insurance Commissioners' Model Laws, Regula-
tions and Guidelines. 5 1 The state statutes typically prohibit the forma-
tion or expansion of insurance holding companies unless authorized by
the Commissioner after a hearing. They also list standards for the Com-
missioner to apply when considering a petition for the formation of an
insurance holding company and grant the Commissioner authority to
block mergers or consolidations of insurance holding companies. 5 2 As
interpreted by the Court in National Securities, the McCarran-Ferguson
Act clearly shields this type of state legislation from attack under the
federal commerce clause when the legislation is applied to protect the
interests of policyholders.
49. National Securities, 393 U.S. at 46 (quoting ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 20-73183
(Supp. 1969)). The National Securities Court held the statute invalid, however, insofar
as it purported to protect state shareholder interests: "[T]his is not insurance regula-
tion, but securities regulation." Id at 460.
50. Amicus Brief for the National Association of Insurance Commissioners at 3,
Hoylake Inv. Ltd. v. Washburn, 723 F. Supp. 42 (N.D. Ill. 1989) (No. 89-C-5822)
[hereinafter N.A.I.C. Brief] (citing I NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF INSURANCE COMMIS-
SIONERS (NAIC) PROCEEDINGS 176 (1969)). An "insurance holding company" is typi-
cally defined as consisting of "two or more affiliated juridical] persons, one or more
of which is an insurer." KAN. STAT. ANN. § 40-3302(d) (1985). "Person" is defined in
the same statute as "an individual, corporation, a partnership, an association, ajoint
stock company, a trust, an unincorporated organization, any similar entity or any
combination of the foregoing acting in concert .. " Id. at § 40-3302(0.
51. See N.A.I.C. Brief, supra note 50, at 5; see also ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 20-
481-20-481.23 (1990); IDAHO CODE §§ 41-3801-41-3815 (1990); ILL. REV. STAT. ch.
73, para. 743.12a-743.28c (1988); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 40-3301-40-3313 (1986); OR.
REV. STAT. §§ 732.505-732.595 (1989); WASH. REV. CODE §§ 48.31.010-48.31.185
(1990).
52. N.A.I.C. Brief, supra note 50, at 5.
Cornell International Law Journal
The Illinois insurance holding company statute is substantially simi-
lar to the other statutes involved in the Hoylake bid. 53 It requires that
the Insurance Commissioner disapprove proposed acquisitions of Illi-
nois insurance holding companies, whether direct or indirect, unless the
Commissioner finds that:
(a) the proposed entity will satisfy state insurance licensing
requirements;
(b) the acquisition will not tend to create a monopoly;
(c) the acquiring party is financially stable;
(d) the acquiring entity's plans for the local insurance company are "fair
and reasonable" to the policyholders; or
(e) the competence of those who would control the state insurance com-
pany is such that the acquisition "would be in the best interests of the
policyholders of such company.... 54
Persons who make a tender offer for an Illinois insurance holding com-
pany without prior approval by the Commissioner face both civil and
criminal sanctions.5 5
Under the Illinois Act, the offeror must file a "Form A" with the
Commissioner, together with the tender offer materials, prior to sending
any information to shareholders of the target company. 56 "Form A"
requires information detailing the proposed transaction and the resul-
tant status of the insurance company. 57 The Commissioner reviews the
documents and may request additional information. 58 The Commis-
sioner can convene a hearing if the offer fails to comply with the statu-
tory standards or will "adversely affect policyholders or the [insurance
buying] public." 59 Any party unsatisfied with the Commissioner's deci-
sion may petition for judicial review. 60
2. Administration of State Insurance Holding Company Statutes
The 1988 acquisition of Farmers by BAT reveals the cumbersome appli-
cation of the insurance holding company statutes in Illinois and the
other states involved in the Hoylake bid. In each state, Farmers
opposed the acquisition. 6i In some states, the Commissioners required
lengthy additional filings. For example, the process was prolonged by
67 days in Idaho and 112 days in Texas. 6 2 In three other states, hear-
ings were delayed for at least four months.63 Once the hearings were
53. For simplicity, this section discusses the Illinois statute. Though each state
statute has variations, their operation is substantially similar. See statutes cited supra
note 51.
54. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch.73, para. 743.8 (1988).
55. Id. at para. 743.11.
56. Id. at para. 743.4.
57. Id. at para. 743.5.
58. Il. Ins. Reg. § 851.40 (1988).
59. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 73, para. 743.8(2) (1988).
60. Id. at para. 131.27.
61. Hoylake Brief, supra note 12, at 14.
62. Id.
63. Id.
Vol. 24
1991 Extraterritorial Reach of State Insurance Statutes
under way, they varied in length from five to fifty days and generated
thousands of transcript pages.6 4 Not surprisingly, by the time four of
the nine states disapproved of the merger proposal, 106 to 152 days had
elapsed since the "Form A" filings.6 5 Eventually, BAT and Farmers
agreed to mutually favorable terms and refocused their efforts toward
reversing the state disapprovals. 6 6 Ultimately each of the disapproving
states reversed its position, with the last approval coming some nine
months after the initial "Form A" filings. 67 Thus, the application of the
insurance holding company statutes to the successful acquisition of
Farmers was time-consuming, onerous, and inconsistent.
D. Hoylake's Actions in the Federal Courts and the Ruling of the
British Takeover Panel
Prior to the British Takeover Panel's ruling, Hoylake brought actions in
each of the nine states to enjoin application of the insurance holding
company statutes to its tender offer for BAT.68 The federal courts in
those states each denied Hoylake's motions. While those motions were
pending, however, the Takeover Panel surprisingly waived the twelve
month lapse period, which somewhat mitigated the conflict between the
U.S. and British regulatory systems.
1. Hoylake's Arguments in the District Courts
In support of its motions for preliminary injunction in the district
courts, Hoylake argued that the state statutes at issue were unconstitu-
tional under the federal and foreign commerce clauses insofar as they
purported to regulate foreign tender offers and thus unduly burden for-
eign commerce. 6 9 Hoylake contended that the McCarran-Ferguson Act
did not authorize states to block tender offers made in foreign securities
markets. 70 Hoylake also argued that the states had adequate post-acqui-
sition statutory powers to ensure the integrity of Farmers after Hoylake
assumed control; it was therefore unnecessary to derail Hoylake's bid by
applying the state statutes. 71
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 15. State Commissioners often aid the defense of a hostile takeover by
withholding approval until an offer is accepted. Not surprisingly, this practice has
been criticized. Ultimately, BAT acquired Farmers in a deal not governed by the City
Code, because Farmers' shares were sold on the U.S. Stock Exchange.
68. Only three of the opinions have been published. See supra note 8.
69. Hoylake Brief, supra note 12, at 22. The commerce clause provides that
"Congress shall have Power... [t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations ..
U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. See also Hoylake Brief, supra note 12, at 21-27.
70. Hoylake Brief, supra note 12, at 29-32. Hoylake also alleged that the state
statutes violated the due process clause of the fifth amendment by attempting to pro-
hibit contracts for the purchase of BAT securities entered entirely outside of the state
borders. Id. at 32-24.
71. Id at 25-26 (arguing that the Insurance Director of Illinois has statutory
power-for example, the ability to issue cease-and-desist orders-adequate to police
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2. The District Courts' Rulings
The federal district court in each of the nine states ruled against Hoy-
lake.72 By applying the broad National Securities test,7 3 the courts found
the merger to be so closely related to the integrity of the insurance com-
panies as to be part of the "business of insurance." 74 The courts thus
held that the McCarran-Ferguson Act exempted the state insurance stat-
utes from commerce clause attack. 75
The courts also rejected the argument that the McCarran-Ferguson
Act does not authorize a state to regulate extraterritorial activities. 7 6
The courts stated that concerns of extraterritoriality did not apply
because the regulated insurance companies were within the territories of
the respective states. The courts thereby skirted Hoylake's argument
that the extraterritorial regulation of British takeover battles was uncon-
stitutional, and avoided any real consideration of the international
interests.
post-acquisition changes in the insurance holding company without blocking the
tender offer).
72. Because only three of the decisions are available, see supra notes 8 and 67, the
discussion is necessarily restricted to these three decisions.
73. The Court in National Securities stated in dicta that statutes regulating mergers
for the purpose of protecting policyholders' interests affected "the business of insur-
ance" and were therefore authorized by the McCarran-Ferguson Act. The test of
National Securities is whether the "[state-regulated] activities of insurance companies
relate so closely to their status as reliable insurers that they too must be placed in the
same class ...." National Securities, 393 U.S. at 460. See also supra notes 44-45 and
accompanying text.
74. The courts rejected Hoylake's contention that the Pireno test should apply. In
Union Labor Life Ins. Co. v. Pireno, 458 U.S. 119 (1982), the Court established a
restrictive test for determining what constitutes the "business of insurance." Busi-
ness practices encompassed by this definition were to be exempt from antitrust laws
pursuant to 2(b) of the McCarran-Ferguson Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b). The Court
articulated three criteria: "first, whether the practice has the effect of transferring or
spreading a policyholder's risk; second, whether the practice is an integral part of the
policy relationship between the insurer and the insured; and third, whether the prac-
tice is limited to entities within the insurance industry." Id. at 129.
Two of the district courts which considered Hoylake's motions held that the Pireno
test only applied when the limited protection of § 2(b) is at issue and when federal
antitrust statutes are involved. Washburn, 723 F. Supp. at 46; and Bell, 723 F. Supp. at
579. Although this holding seems plausible given the structure of the Act and the
fact that the Pireno Court made no mention of overruling National Securities, the third
district court held that even under Pireno's restrictive test, the insurance holding com-
pany statute "relates to the spreading and underwriting of risks, for the [insurance
commissioner's] review assures that Farmers, or any domestic insurance company,
remains a reliable insurer." Gallinger, 722 F. Supp. at 577.
75. See Bell, 723 F. Supp. at 579; Washburn, 723 F. Supp. at 43, 45-46; Gallinger,
722 F. Supp. at 577.
76. "[The Illinois Act does not purport to regulate the extraterritorial activities
of its insurance companies." Washburn, 723 F. Supp. at 47. "The Kansas Act regu-
lates domestic insurers and entities that own Kansas insurance companies. Thus, the
act cannot be characterized as one regulating commerce 'wholly outside its bor-
ders.' " Bell, 723 F. Supp. at 580 (citing Edgar v. Mite Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 642-43.
"[W]hile it is true that the Act will have some extraterritorial effect outside of Ari-
zona, that effect is indirect and collateral to the more limited purpose of protecting
insurance policy holders in the State of Arizona." Gallinger, 722 F. Supp. at 578.
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The district courts further held that even if the state statutes were
not authorized by the McCarran-Ferguson Act, they fully comported
with the Supreme Court's ruling in CTS Corporation v. Dynamics Corpora-
tion of America.7 7 In CTS, the Court upheld an Indiana takeover regula-
tion that "pose[d] no threat of inconsistent regulation"7 8 because it only
applied to target corporations domiciled in Indiana. The courts consid-
ering Hoylake's motions found the CTS reasoning controlling because
state regulation of a merger involving local corporations was involved.
The district courts either refuted or ignored Hoylake's argument that
the threat of inconsistent regulation was present due to inconsistencies
between the British City Code and the state statutes.79 The courts like-
wise failed to differentiate between statutes regulating domestic mergers
and those regulating a foreign securities transaction.
The district courts summarily dismissed Hoylake's contention that
the state statutes unconstitutionally encroached on the federal govern-
ment's control over foreign affairs pursuant to the "foreign commerce
clause."8 0 The courts saw no British laws or policies which might be
infringed by the state regulatory processes.8 1 Further, the courts failed
to address Hoylake's argument that their rulings enhanced the risk of
multiple regulation.8 2 Again, the courts considered the state statutes
without regard to the conflicting British regulatory scheme. Because the
courts found that no British policies were implicated, they considered it
unnecessary to apply the second prong of the Japan Line holding requir-
ing the regulation of foreign commerce to receive heightened scrutiny
because the foreign commerce clause dictates that the U.S. speak "with
77. In CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America, 481 U.S. 69 (1987), the
Supreme Court upheld an Indiana statute prohibiting raiders from acquiring voting
rights in target companies without the approval of the target's shareholders. The
Court held that the Indiana statute was within the state's "authority to regulate
domestic corporations" because the Indiana statute did not "prohibit any entity-
resident or non-resident-from offering to purchase, or from purchasing, shares in
Indiana corporations, or from attempting thereby to gain control. It only provides
regulatory procedures designed for the better protection of the corporation's share-
holders." Id. at 93. See also Bell, 723 F. Supp. at 579; Washburn, 723 F. Supp. at 47;
Gallinger, 722 F. Supp. at 578.
78. CTS Corp., 481 U.S. at 88.
79. See Washburn, 723 F. Supp. at 47 (no threat of inconsistent regulation). The
other opinions make no mention of the argument.
80. See Hoylake Brief, supra note 12.
81. See Bell, 723 F. Supp. at 581 (Kansas not trying to express any foreign policy
or to encroach on the laws of affairs with foreign governments); Washburn, 723 F.
Supp. at 49 (policies of foreign governments not at issue in the Illinois regulatory
process); Gallinger, 722 F. Supp. at 578.
82. This argument relied upon Japan Line Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441
U.S. 434 (1979). In Japan Line, the Court voided the application of California's ad
valorem property tax to foreign-owned cargo shipping containers used in foreign
commerce as violative of the foreign commerce clause. The Court held that because
the containers were already being taxed by Japan, "a state tax, even though 'fairly
apportioned' to reflect an instrumentality's presence within the State, may subject
foreign commerce to the risk of a double tax burden.., which the [foreign] com-
merce clause forbids." Id. at 448.
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one voice when regulating commercial relations with foreign govern-
ments."83 In ruling on Hoylake's motions, the courts did not consider
whether this need to "speak with one voice" might be thwarted when
nine different states effectively block a British bid that complies fully
with British takeover regulations.
Thus the courts collectively failed to adequately consider the inter-
national implications involved in their decisions. Whatever the courts
thought of the British interests in regulating takeovers occurring within
the British securities market, or of the U.S. interests in the uniform reg-
ulation of foreign takeovers having domestic impact, such interests car-
ried no weight in the courts' deliberations.
3. The British Takeover Panel's Ruling
Concurrently with its actions in the U.S. courts, Hoylake sought two sep-
arate remedies from the British Takeover Panel. First, it sought to bar
BAT from participating in the U.S. regulatory proceedings,8 4 alleging
that participation without the consent of BAT shareholders violated the
City Code's prohibition on "frustrating action."8 5 BAT's use of the
state regulatory process in an effort to defeat Hoylake's offer appeared
to be frustrating action in light of previous Takeover Panel decisions.8 6
Had the Takeover Panel proscribed BAT's involvement in the regula-
tory process, Hoylake might have hastened the state regulatory process
and kept its offer alive.
The Takeover Panel, however, concluded that none of BAT's multi-
farious activities-lobbying, intervention in district court litigation,8 7
and participation in state regulatory proceedings-constituted frustrat-
ing action under the City Code.8 8 Because BAT did not institute the
district court litigation and its actions were "designed to uphold the
jurisdiction of the regulators," 8 9 the Takeover Panel found no violation
in BAT's involvement in the district court proceedings. Similarly, the
Panel distinguished BAT's intervention in the state regulatory proceed-
ings from intervention in litigation. 90 The basis of this distinction was
83. Id. at 451 (quoting Michelin Tire Corp. v. Wages, 423 U.S. 276, 285 (1976)).
84. BAT intervened in the state regulatory proceedings to persuade the Insur-
ance Commissioners to rule against Hoylake. Takeover Panel, supra note 3, at 14-
15.
85. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
86. The Takeover Panel had recently proscribed a target company's involvement
in antitrust litigation in the U.S. as frustrating action. Decision of the Panel on Take-
overs and Mergers, Consolidated Gold Fields p.l.c. (May 9, 1989). See also Epstein,
supra note 31, at 44.
87. BAT intervened as a defendant in the Hoylake actions in the U.S. courts. See
Epstein, supra note 31, at 41.
88. See id. at 46 (arguing that it is impossible to reconcile this decision with the
Takeover Panel's ruling in Consolidated Gold Fields that seeking an injunction in U.S.
courts constituted frustrating action and was proscribed by the City Code).
89. Takeover Panel, supra note 3, at 15.
90. In an earlier ruling, the Panel had proscribed the institution of litigation as
frustrating action. See Epstein, supra note 31, at 44.
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that the regulatory agency, and not BAT, instituted the proceedings. 9 1
The Panel dismissed Hoylake's argument that lobbying U.S. insurance
commissioners and congressmen constituted frustrating action on the
ground that such lobbying often takes place in Britain during takeover
battles. 92 The Panel thus somewhat apprehensively permitted BAT to
continue its "wide ranging and thorough" efforts to block the offer in
the U.S. 98
Hoylake also sought relief from the twelve month lapse period dic-
tated by the City Code. 94 Surprisingly, the Takeover Panel granted this
relief.95 The Takeover Panel accepted Hoylake's argument that unless
the Panel relaxed the twelve month prohibition on renewal of lapsed
offers, the "ability of the [City Code] to provide a sensible framework
for offers... for multinational companies, could be called into question
and certain companies rendered bid proof by the interaction of the
Code and the foreign regulatory system." 9 6 Thus, the Takeover Panel
ruled that Hoylake would have twenty-one days from the end of the reg-
ulatory process in the U.S. in which to renew its bid.
The Takeover Panel was forced to relax the time frame of the City
Code to prevent the U.S. regulatory proceedings from blocking the bid.
The Panel emphasized that its main concern was to give the sharehold-
ers a chance to evaluate Hoylake's offer.9 7 The Takeover Panel regret-
ted the "undesirable" uncertainty wreaked upon the management of
91. Takeover Panel, supra note 3, at 13.
92. The Takeover Panel stated that lobbying is also common in Britain.
It is not a very direct way of obstructing an offer, and since it is possible for
the bidder to engage in counter lobbying, the effect of the process is simply
to enable one of the public interest decision takers [sic] to have presented to
them both sides of the argument.
Id. at 12.
93. Id. at 13. The Panel twice cautioned BAT against escalating its involvement
in the U.S. It stated: "BAT should, however,... act in [the state regulatory] pro-
ceedings in such a way as to avoid a charge of frustration." Id. at 14. "[I]f this litiga-
tion continues, however, BAT should consider its future involvement very carefully
with regard to [the] General Principle [prohibiting frustrating action]." Id. at 15.
94. Id.
95. See Epstein, supra note 31, at 46.
96. Takeover Panel, supra note 3, at 17. The Takeover Panel also compared the
American state regulatory process with the British MMC, which investigates potential
mergers if the government has concerns about the possible formation of monopolies.
See supra note 30. Once an investigation commences, the offer lapses. The City Code
provides, however, that the offer may be renewed within 21 days after the termina-
tion of the investigation. Takeover Panel, supra note 3, at 22. The same argument
was made to no avail in the Consolidated Gold Fields hearing. Epstein, supra note 3 1, at
44.
97. The Panel states:
mhe central consideration must be that the effect of the US regulatory pro-
cess means that shareholders will not have an opportunity of considering an
offer from Hoylake free from regulatory consents and within the [City] Code
timescale .... [Thus] our principal function is to see that shareholders are
dealt with fairly.
Takeover Panel, supra note 3, at 22.
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BAT as a result of its ruling,9 8 but indicated that it was willing to com-
promise this concern to maintain some shareholder control over the
takeover process.9 9
The Takeover Panel's ruling mitigated the conflict with the U.S.
regulatory system, but it did so at the expense of policies central to the
City Code. The City Code prohibits frustrating actions while an offer is
pending, but after the Panel's ruling, BAT was free to engage in such
actions during the lapse period.'0 0 The value of the deal to the share-
holders could have diminished greatly because of the extra maneuvering
time. For example, during this time the target company might have sold
off valuable assets to render itself unattractive to the offeror. In such a
scenario, the target shareholders would lose the chance to accept a
potentially beneficial offer, as well as the long-term value of their invest-
ment. Such activity, although common in the U.S., is proscribed by the
British regulatory system. 10 ' Likewise, the uncertainty wrought by the
Panel's ruling forced BAT to focus more on defensive posturing than on
production, again hurting its shareholders.' 0 2 In short, application of
the U.S. regulations forced the Takeover Panel to proverbially bite off
its hand to save its arm.
4. The Effect of The District Court Decisions on the Hoylake Bid
As a result of the district court rulings denying Hoylake relief from the
application of the state insurance holding company statutes, nearly all of
the state regulatory proceedings were still pending when the offer was
finally withdrawn. 10 3 Prior to the withdrawal, BAT actively restructured
itself in an effort to fend off the bid.' 0 4 The opportunity for a successful
takeover was substantially diminished, although Hoylake's immense
financial resources kept some hope of a tender offer alive.' 0 5 But as
BAT restructured itself and strengthened management control over a
shrinking corporation, the Hoylake offer became economically
infeasible. 106
Moreover, the tenor of the district court rulings appears to fore-
shadow the strict application of state takeover laws regardless of their
impact on U.S. policyholders. If eight states approved Hoylake's propo-
sal, but one disapproved it, according to the district courts' reasoning,
that one state could effectively block the entire deal. A decision by eight
states that Hoylake's plans for Farmers were generally sound would
98. Id.
99. See id. at 22-23.
100. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
101. See id.
102. See supra notes 34-40 and accompanying text.
103. See Hoylake Abandons BAT Bid, supra note 22, at 1, col. 1 (the California insur-
ance department ruled against Hoylake's application approximately two weeks before
Hoylake withdrew its bid).
104. See supra note 10.
105. See Wall St.J., Feb. 20, 1990, at BI1, col. 2.
106. See id.
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indicate the security of policyholders' interests under Hoylake's steward-
ship. The ninth state's disapproval, therefore, could only appear arbi-
trary and would likely provoke an unfavorable response from the British
government.
Regardless of whether the extraterritorial application of insurance
holding company statutes can survive constitutional challenge, 10 7 the
international concerns, as a practical and diplomatic matter, cannot be
overlooked. When two or more nations have conflicting policy concerns
and regulatory systems, compromise is necessary to promote the
smooth and orderly conduct of international affairs. The Takeover
Panel's acquiescence made the task of the district courts easier.108
These courts further simplified their decisions by disregarding British
policy concerns. But the issue of when and how the courts should con-
sider foreign policy interests, which may be jeopardized by the extrater-
ritorial effects of U.S. law, remains.
II. Limitations on the Extraterritorial Application of U.S. Antitrust Law:
An Analogy
Because the extraterritorial application of U.S. state legislation to
impede or block foreign mergers is an undeveloped area of law, this
section looks at the extraterritorial application of U.S. antitrust law as an
analogue to elucidate possible approaches to the merger problem. U.S.
antitrust law has often been applied to block the formation of foreign
cartels which sell goods in the U.S. when such arrangements would
potentially lessen competition in domestic markets. Because firms often
enter foreign cartels in full compliance with foreign regulations which
may conflict with U.S. regulations, 10 9 courts must determine which
nation's rules should govern. As in the Hoylake scenario, sensitive
issues involving the sovereign power of foreign nations accompany
determinations of the applicability of U.S. antitrust law. In the antitrust
area, U.S. courts have developed a body of case law that could address
the concerns present in international takeovers. Therefore, the extra-
territorial application of U.S. antitrust law provides a useful analogue for
analysis of the Hoylake situation.' 10
107. See supra notes 81-83 and accompanying text. A more extensive analysis of
the constitutionality of the state insurance company holding statutes is beyond the
scope of this Note.
108. See supra text accompanying notes 94-100.
109. Unlike the situation in Hoylake, conflicts in antitrust cases are often "false" in
that compliance with both schemes, given the broad scope of the U.S. interest and
the negligible foreign interest, is both possible and not unduly burdensome to the
foreign entity. See, e.g., Note, The Use of Interest Analysis in the Extraterritorial Application
of United States Antitrust Law, 16 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 147, 180-82 (1983) (presenting an
example of a false conflict in the antitrust area).
110. As a preliminary matter, the U.S. antitrust statutes, unlike the McCarran-Fer-
guson Act or state statutes created in its wake, exhibit a specific intent to regulate
foreign commerce. The Sherman Act, the foundational antitrust statute, states in sec-
tion one that "[e]very contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or
conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce.., with foreign nations, is declared to
Cornell International Law Journal
The same concerns which underlie cases in the international anti-
trust context are present when state courts apply their laws to predomi-
nately foreign mergers and acquisitions. When compliance with both
foreign and domestic law proves impossible, U.S. courts must decide
which law shall govern. With an eye toward international relations,
courts must decide whether protecting a recognized interest is worth
engendering friction with a foreign state by applying U.S. law. Whether
the U.S. can effectively enforce its law against the foreign persons or
entities involved presents a further, practical question. The foreign
country is unlikely to aid enforcement if it believes the U.S. is infringing
upon its sovereignty."' Such are the concerns domestic courts typi-
cally address when determining whether U.S. antitrust law should block
transactions occurring beyond U.S. borders.
In United States v. ALCOA, 1 12 a landmark antitrust case involving
U.S. jurisdiction over foreign transactions, Learned Hand, writing for a
special appellate panel of last resort,1 13 introduced as a broad basis of
jurisdiction the "effects doctrine."' "14 Aluminum Limited, a Canadian
company, allegedly conspired with several European companies to limit
their production of aluminum and to fix prices. 1 5 Hand considered
what role international law might play in his decision-"as a Court of
the United States, we cannot look beyond our own law. Nevertheless, it
is quite true that we are not to read general words, such as those in this
Act, without regard to the limitations customarily observed by nations
upon the exercise of their powers .... 11 16 Hand nevertheless went
beyond the customary bases ofjurisdiction when he proposed that "it is
be illegal." 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976). As a conscious use by Congress of its powers under
the foreign commerce clause, the Sherman Act is immune from constitutional attack
as a matter of U.S. law. By negative implication, and application of the reasoning of
Japan Line, the state insurance statutes are on shaky ground when used to impede or
block a British tender offer that complies with the laws of Britain.
111. See infra notes 162-64 and accompanying text.
112. United States v. ALCOA, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
113. This panel was set up because the Supreme Court could not achieve a quo-
rum with judges who did not have a conflict of interest in the case. ALCOA thus has
the force of a Supreme Court decision. See 15 U.S.C. § 29 (1976); see also United
States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 322 U.S. 716 (1944).
114. ALCOA, 148 F.2d at 416. Prior to ALCOA, the standard derived from Ameri-
can Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347 (1909), was far more restrictive. In
American Banana, Justice Holmes for the Court declined jurisdiction over a dispute
involving an alleged conspiracy between United Fruit and the Costa Rican Govern-
ment to monopolize the trade of bananas in the U.S. Holmes stated:
For another jurisdiction, if it should happen to lay hold of the actor, to treat
him according to its own notions rather than those of the place where he did
the acts, not only would be unjust, but would be an interference with the
authority of another sovereign, contrary to the comity of nations, which the
other state concerned might resent.
Id. at 356. Holmes also rested the Court's holding on the independent ground that
"[aIll legislation is primafacie territorial," and therefore, the Sherman Act could not
apply to the activities of foreign entities. Id. at 357 (quoting Ex parte Blain, In re
Sawers, 12 Ch. D. 522, 528 (1879)).
115. ALCOA, 148 F.2d at 442.
116. Id. at 443.
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settled law... that any state may impose liabilities, even upon persons
not within its allegiance, for conduct outside its borders that has conse-
quences within its borders which the state reprehends; and these liabili-
ties other states will ordinarily recognize."'1 17 The effects doctrine thus
stands for the proposition that U.S. courts have jurisdiction over anti-
competitive agreements entered into by foreigners abroad, provided
that substantial effects on U.S. commerce are foreseeable from the
nature of the agreement.1 18 Despite the weak precedential basis for the
effects doctrine, and despite the fact that the doctrine contravened inter-
national law, the effects doctrine quickly became established law in the
U.S. 11 9
Because international cartels frequently involve American compa-
nies, pure application of the effects doctrine-to cartels involving solely
foreign entities-proved quite rare. 120 Courts in the U.S. have, how-
ever, used the effects doctrine to apply U.S. antitrust law in contraven-
tion of important policies of foreign nations. Indeed, the effects
doctrine has led to virtually uniform application of U.S. antitrust law.121
Not surprisingly, the effects doctrine produced widespread international
criticism of the growing reach of U.S. law.'
22
Commentators have criticized the broad application of U.S. anti-
trust law under the effects doctrine because "[i]t conflicts with the regu-
117. Id. The cases Hand cited in support of this proposition concerned interstate
and not international jurisdiction. See Strassheim v. Daily, 221 U.S. 280 (1911);
Lamar v. United States, 240 U.S. 60 (1916); Ford v. United States, 273 U.S. 593
(1927); see also A.D. NEALE & M.L. STEPHENS, INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS AND NATIONAL
JURISDICTION 46 (1988).
118. See A.D. NEALE & M.L. STEPHENS, supra note 119, at 49.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 63.
121. The application of U.S. law under the effects doctrine is quite rigorous in that
any case which raises a colorable claim will have some effect on U.S. markets.
122. See, e.g., Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100 (1969).
Zenith's complaint alleged, inter alia, that its sales of electronic equipment in Canada
were hindered by the refusal of Hazeltine to grant licenses from a Canadian patent
pool. The Canadian Government had encouraged the creation of the pool for the
purpose of granting licenses to those who agreed to manufacture equipment for the
Canadian market and refusing licenses to companies, like Zenith, who refused to do
so. The Supreme Court's decision, awarding Zenith treble damages, was criticized by
international commentators along the following lines:
In neither litigation [Hazeltine and a similar action] did the court seriously
consider the possibility that Canadian policy interests in not having US Anti-
trust law enforced so as to undercut Canadian policy in Canadian markets,
should at least be weighed against US interests in promoting export opportu-
nities for US businesses selling to Canada.
W. KNIGHTON & D. ROSENTHAL, NATIONAL LAWS AND INTERNATIONAL COMMERCE 31
(1982). See also United States v. Watchmakers of Switz. Information Center Inc.,
1963 Trade Cas. (CCH) 70,600 (S.D.N.Y. 1962). In Watchmakers, the court
employed the effects doctrine to exercise jurisdiction over an alleged Swiss and
American conspiracy to create a monopoly in the U.S. watch market. The court's
decree-purporting to require changes in the Swiss industry's arrangement in Swit-
zerland-was later substantially modified in the wake of diplomatic protests by the
Swiss Government. See A.D. NEALE & M.L. STEPHENS, supra note 119, at 67.
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lation by other nations of their domestic economies" and blocks foreign
firms from entering U.S. markets. 123 In a global economy where trans-
actions necessarily cross national boundaries, a measure of compromise
by the U.S. is necessary to ensure stable relationships with its many
transnational trading partners. 124 Conflicts with foreign economic reg-
ulations, exclusion of foreign firms from U.S. markets, and threats to
foreign relationships are similarly present when states apply insurance
legislation to block predominately foreign takeovers conducted in com-
pliance with foreign regulatory schemes.
Extraterritorial application of U.S. antitrust law through the effects
doctrine has also prompted some countries to institute blocking legisla-
tion. 125 Such legislation, also termed "clawback" legislation, attempts
to block U.S. jurisdiction over foreign corporations by preventing dis-
covery and denying foreign enforcement of U.S. judgments. In short,
the long reach of U.S. antitrust legislation has provoked considerable
foreign resentment and damaged U.S. international trading relation-
ships. Application of state insurance company holding laws to predomi-
nately foreign mergers could provoke similar resentment and further
damage U.S. international trading relationships.
In response to these developments, the Ninth Circuit articulated a
new approach in Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America.' 26 Timberlane
involved two American companies and an action for damages under the
Sherman Act. Judge Choy set out a three-part test for determining the
reasonableness of asserting U.S. jurisdiction, stating that "[a]n effect on
United States commerce, although necessary to the exercise ofjurisdic-
tion .... is alone not a sufficient basis on which to determine whether
American authority should be asserted in a given case as a matter of inter-
national comity and fairness."' 127 Preliminarily, there must be some
"effect" on American commerce. Next, the effect must be "sufficiently
large" to cause a cognizable violation under the antitrust law. Finally,
the court must decide whether the alleged violation's effect on American
interests is great enough in comparison to the foreign nation's interests
123. Note, supra note I 11, at 148.
124. See generally Dunfee & Friedman, The Extra-Territorial Application of United States
Antitrust Laws: A Proposal for an Interim Solution, 45 OHIo ST. LJ. 883 (1984) (taking the
position that courts should vigorously apply U.S. antitrust law to force a legislative
response); Pettit & Styles, The International Response to the Extraterritorial Application of
United States Antitrust Laws, 37 Bus. LAw. 697 (1982) (discussing the dangers to world
trade as a result of extraterritorial application of U.S. antitrust law and responses
thereto).
125. Among the nations to impose blocking legislation are Britain, France, Ger-
many, Italy, Belgium, Canada, Australia, and South Africa. See Pettit & Styles, supra
note 126; see also Note, Power to Reverse Foreign Judgments: The British Clawback Statute
Under International Law, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 1097 (1981).
126. Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America, 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1977).
127. Timberlane, 549 F.2d at 613. "Comity" has been defined by the Supreme
Court as "the recognition which one nation allows within its territory to the legisla-
tive, executive or judicial acts of another nation, having due regard both to interna-
tional duty and convenience .... Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 164 (1895).
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to warrant the application of U.S. law. 128
Judge Choy then presented a non-exclusive list of factors for con-
sideration under the third prong:
1) The degree of conflict with foreign law or policy,
2) the nationality or allegiance of the parties and the location or principal
places of business of corporations,
3) the extent to which enforcement by either state can be expected to
achieve compliance,
4) the relative significance of effects in the U.S. as compared with those
elsewhere,
5) the extent to which there is explicit purpose to harm or affect U.S.
commerce,
6) the foreseeability of such effect, and
7) the relative importance to the violation charged of conduct within the
U.S. as compared with conduct abroad. 12 9
Judge Choy enumerated the factors in this third prong to force courts to
look at the conflicts with foreign regulatory schemes that might be cre-
ated by the application of U.S. law. Only after such consideration can
courts responsibly determine whether the U.S. interests are great
enough to justify extraterritorial application of U.S. law. 13o
Critics of Timberlane contend that the balancing test is impossible to
apply. For example Judge Wilkey of the D.C. Circuit, a prominent U.S.
critic, wrote that because of the difficulty of assessing foreign interests,
"[w]hen there is any doubt, [domestic] interests will tend to be favored
over foreign interests." 1 31 Such criticism, echoed by British commenta-
tors, 13 2 essentially views the balancing test as outcome determinative in
that domestic courts will always be able to apply U.S. law. If the balance
in fact led to the consistent application of U.S. law, then the Timberlane
test would be a mere exercise in form, devoid of substantive purpose
128. Timberlane, 549 F.2d at 613.
129. Id. at 614.
130. Id. at 614, 615. The 7imberlane test has been followed in a number of U.S.
federal district courts. See, e.g., National Bank of Can. v. Interbank Card Ass'n, 666
F.2d 6 (2nd Cir. 1981); Montreal Trading Ltd. v. Amax, Inc., 661 F.2d 864 (10th Cir.
1981); Mannington Mills Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287 (3rd Cir. 1979);
ONE Shipping Ltd. v. Flota Mercante Grancolumbiana SA, No. 86-7988 (S.D.N.Y.,
May 22, 1986) (discussed in A.D. NEALE & M.L. STEPHENS, supra note 119, at 79);
Daishowa Int'l v. North Coast Export Corp., 1982-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 64774 (N.D.
Cal. 1982); United States v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 471 F. Supp. 532 (N.D. Cal.
1978).
131. Laker Airways, Ltd. v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909 (D.C.
Cir. 1984) (Wilkey, J.). Wilkey later wrote:
It is unrealistic to expect courts of the United States, or for that matter, of any
country to carry out an evaluation of the interest which a country has in a
particular law or policy or of the relative importance of its application to any
particular matter. Such a matter is essentially nonjusticiable.
Wilkey, American Antitrust: Adjusting Conflicts with Other Legal Systems in PRIVATE INVES-
TORS ABROAD--PROBLEMS AND SOLUrIoNs 2-7 § 202[2] (Moss ed. 1985) (quoting P.
DURUCK, ACT OF STATE AND EXTRATERRITORIAL REACH: PROBLEMS OF LAW AND POLICY
44 (Lacey ed. 1983).
132. See, e.g., A.D. NEALE & M.L. STEPHENS, supra note 119, at 76.
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and functionally equivalent to the effects doctrine.' 33 Others have
attacked the Timberlane test because it considers non-justiciable factors
which are normally the province of the legislature or the executive.13 4
Such criticism is unproductive, as it ignores the central problem: courts,
forced to decide whether to apply U.S. law, must do so on some princi-
pled basis.13 5
Despite its flaws the balancing approach of Timberlane and its prog-
eny136 at least forces courts to consider the foreign interests involved.
Coupled with the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act of
1982,137 the U.S. clearly has curtailed its broad exercise of jurisdiction
in the international antitrust arena. 138 Moreover, the balancing test
articulated in Timberland should at least prevent the application of U.S.
antitrust law in particularly outrageous circumstances-for example
where the U.S. interest is minimal and the foreign interests are great. As
a means of alleviating international conflict, the Timberlane approach is
certainly preferable to the virtually uniform application of U.S. law
under the effects doctrine. The practical difficulty of ascertaining the
appropriate interests does not justify ignoring important international
concerns.
The Tentative Draft of the Restatement of Foreign Relations Law
endorses a balancing approach, stating that even when a recognized
basis for jurisdiction is present, a state should not exercise jurisdiction
"with respect to the activities ... or interests of persons or things having
connections with another state or states when the exercise of such juris-
diction is unreasonable."' 3 9 "Reasonableness" is defined in terms of a
balancing test which is culled from Timberlane and its progeny. 140 This is
133. Fortunately, such is not the case. See, e.g., supra note 113 and cases cited
therein.
134. See, e.g., Note, Forum Non Conveniens and the Extraterritorial Application of United
States Antitrust Law, 94 YALE LJ. 1693, 1702-06 (1985).
135. The strict application of U.S. law under the effects doctrine is every bit as
"political" as weighing the factors in the balancing test-to apply the U.S. laws in
extreme situations is a statement of foreign policy. Likewise, completely declining to
apply U.S. laws in questionable situations would be viewed by some as an impermissi-
ble arrogation of the legislative power by the judiciary.
136. See supra note 127-31 and accompanying text.
137. The Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act of 1982, 15 U.S.C. § 7
(1982), removes foreign conduct from antitrust liability unless it has "direct, substan-
tial and reasonably foreseeable" effects on domestic or import commerce. Id. at
§ 6(a). The heightened threshold effect on the U.S. required to trigger antitrust lia-
bility is more deferential to foreign interests than the "effects doctrine" because
fewer foreign acts are sanctionable.
138. See, e.g., Montreal Trading Ltd. v. Amax, Inc., 661 F.2d 864 (10th Cir. 1981)
(denying U.S. jurisdiction over the alleged conspiracy of the American parent of a
Canadian company to deny Montreal Trading its supply of potash); and United
States v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 471 F. Supp. 532 (N.D. Cal. 1978) (denying U.S.jurisdiction over allegedly illegal patent arrangements between American and Japa-
nese companies).
139. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 403(1) (Tent. Draft No. 7, 1986).
140. Id. at § 403(2).
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a significant departure from an earlier Restatement which adopted
Learned Hand's effects doctrine. 14 1 The current Draft Restatement is of
increasing importance in district court litigation. 142
The excessive reach of U.S. jurisdiction under the effects doctrine
provoked international criticism and retaliation. 143 Courts have used the
Draft Restatement balancing approach culled from Timberlane (the
"'Timberlane/Restatement" approach) to quell criticism and alleviate the
danger of foreign retaliation. Like any balancing test, the Timberlanel
Restatement test is imperfect. The test is, however, a step in the right
direction because it forces courts to assess the extranational conse-
quences of applying U.S. antitrust law.
m. Analysis
The concerns present in the extraterritorial application of U.S. antitrust
law also arise when two or more nations claim jurisdiction to regulate
the same merger. When any one of nine-or fifty-states can block a
securities transaction occurring predominately outside U.S. borders,
international concerns are implicated. In the Hoylake matter, the Brit-
ish Takeover Panel backed down. In future cases, however, Britain or
another sovereign state might not. If U.S. courts continue to apply state
merger laws as if only internal federalism concerns were present, juris-
dictional conflicts of the sort that have arisen in antitrust cases will
surely follow.
The solution might be for Congress to exercise its powers under the
foreign commerce clause' 4 4 to provide a federal mechanism for dealing
with international mergers and acquisitions that affect the U.S. The pos-
sibility of inconsistent action by states, 14 5 the desire to promote the
smooth transaction of international commerce, and the fear of provok-
ing foreign resentment and retaliation provide strong incentives for the
federal government to "speak with one voice." 14 6 Absent such legisla-
tion, the U.S. courts individually must decide whether to apply state
merger laws to foreign transactions subject to foreign regulatory
schemes and whether to apply those laws in a manner that recognizes
foreign interests and possible international repercussions.
Part A of this section argues that the courts reviewing the Hoylake
bid should have considered Britain's interests in regulating the merger.
141. See id. at §§ 18, 39 (1965), stating that a state with jurisdiction to prescribe
rules of conduct may properly require foreign persons to act in contravention of their
own state's laws! This view was "contrary to most authorities on international law
outside the United States." A.D. NEALE & M.L. STEPHENS, supra note 119, at 67.
142. See, e.g., United States v. Davis, 767 F.2d 1025, 1036-37 (2nd Cir. 1985);
United States v. First Nat'l Bank of Chicago, 649 F.2d 341, 346 (7th Cir. 1985); Ples-
sey Co. v. General Elec. Co., 628 F. Supp 477, 495-96 (D. Del. 1986).
143. See supra note 123-26 and accompanying text.
144. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
145. See supra text accompanying notes 108-10.
146. Japan Line, 441 U.S. at 449 (quoting Michelin Tire Corp. v. Wages, 423 U.S.
276, 285 (1976)).
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Part B illustrates hypothetically the necessity of weighing foreign inter-
ests even in transactions involving far less contact with the U.S. than did
the Hoylake bid. Part C applies the Timberlane/Restatement analysis to
the facts of Hoylake and assesses the efficacy of the test in light of those
facts and the hypothetical described in part B. Part D briefly explores a
possible legislative response to the Hoylake conflict.
A. The Flaw in the District Courts' Analyses
The central flaw in the district courts' reasoning in denying Hoylake's
motions was that they acted as if only questions of federalism were
involved. In so doing, the courts ignored the British interest in regulat-
ing a tender offer for a British target company. 147 The precedent the
courts relied on concerned the application of state insurance holding
company legislation to wholly domestic mergers and the McCarran-Fer-
guson Act's shielding of such legislation from commerce clause
attack.' 4 8 Such precedent is of highly questionable value in the Hoylake
setting where important British policies of the protection of sharehold-
ers and the orderly conduct of transactions occurring within Britain's
borders were at stake. 14 9 Because the courts relied on cases involving
only American entities and U.S. constitutional concerns, their reasoning
cannot withstand scrutiny.
In fairness to the district courts, they were acting without guidance
from Congress. The only direction from Congress regarding the pro-
tection of American insurance policyholders is the McCarran-Ferguson
Act, which vests states with the power to protect policyholders. 5 0
Therefore, a holding that the state insurance holding company statutes
were unconstitutional as applied, and thus impotent to block foreign
securities transactions, would have left Hoylake free to dismantle the
insurance companies.' 5l Absent the state regulations, under current
law there would be no protection of the state policyholders' interests.
Understandably, if not admirably, the courts responded to this
dilemma by treating the cases as if there were no conflicting British
interests, 15 2 thereby eliminating the need to examine the extraterritorial
effect of the U.S. laws. 15 3 By focusing only upon the effects of the Hoy-
lake bid in the U.S., the courts made this a very easy case. Under such
an analysis, the strict application of U.S. law was a foregone conclusion.
147. See supra text accompanying notes 33-45.
148. See supra notes 77-82 and accompanying text.
149. See supra notes 24-41 and accompanying text.
150. See supra notes 42-45 and accompanying text.
151. In fact, Hoylake proposed to sell Farmers to Axa-Midi, a French Insurance
Company, in the belief that such a transaction would promote faster regulatory
approval, and in the hope that the money thereby raised would help finance the
tender offer. See The Times (London), Aug. 25, 1989, at 10, col. 1. This gambit
proved to be of no avail to Hoylake in its battle with Insurance Commissioners in the
U.S. Id.
152. See supra note 81.
153. See supra notes 82-83 and accompanying text.
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All of the criticism of the effects doctrine, 154 therefore, is equally appli-
cable to the courts' reasoning in the Hoylake decisions, because both
lead to the strict application of U.S. law in contravention of foreign
interests.
For the same reasons that the rigid application of antitrust law is
undesirable, 155 the strict application of the insurance statutes as exem-
plified by the district courts is equally unacceptable. The infringement
upon the sovereign interests of foreign states and the possibility of neg-
ative repercussions counsel restraint in the application of state merger
laws to block foreign securities transactions solely on the basis of effects
within domestic markets. At a minimum, courts should consider the
magnitude of the effects on the U.S. and the importance of the foreign
interests involved.
B. The Danger of the District Courts' Reasoning: Cases on the
Horizon
That the Takeover Panel backed down in the Hoylake case bears repeat-
ing, but it did so at the expense of important regulatory policies. 15 6 The
next foreign nation faced with the choice of applying its own regulatory
scheme or acquiescing to the quirks of the multi-state system in the U.S.
might not be so obliging. Given that "recent cases have demonstrated
that a connection to the United States can be an exceedingly useful take-
over deterrent,"'157 it is quite plausible that entirely foreign entities
might seek such connections as the ultimate takeover deterrent. The
following scenario, therefore, is highly plausible.
Posit a foreign corporation ("Raider") seeking to take over another
foreign corporation ("Spuds") engaged primarily in the cultivation of
potatoes. Spuds, fearful of the takeover, acquires a twenty-five percent
share of a U.S. insurance holding company ("Lifeline"). This acquisi-
tion is Spuds' only connection with the U.S. Raider fully complies with
the laws of both Spuds' and its own state of domicile and wishes to
tender its offer. Pursuant to statutory authority, the insurance commis-
sioner of the state involved denies approval of Raider's indirect acquisi-
tion of the twenty-five percent interest in Lifeline, which controls an
insurance company doing business in the state. The insurance commis-
sioner's denial blocks Raider's bid.
In such a situation, the effects on U.S. insurance policyholders due
to Raider's acquisition would virtually be nonexistent. The twenty-five
percent ownership change in Lifeline would likely not give Raider a con-
trolling interest in the company, and Lifeline's organization and finan-
cial structure would thus be unchanged. But, the conflict with the
foreign law would be substantial, because Raider fully complied with the
foreign law and would have been free to carry out its takeover bid. Like-
154. See supra notes 124-25 and accompanying text.
155. Id.
156. See supra notes 100-02 and accompanying text.
157. Epstein, supra note 31, at 46.
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wise, the connections with the U.S. would arguably be weaker than in
the Hoylake case because Lifeline does business in only one state. The
lack of impact in the U.S. and the high degree of conflict with the foreign
country law compel the non-application of the state insurance holding
company legislation.
According to the reasoning of the district courts in the Hoylake
decisions, U.S. law would apply and the state insurance commissioner
could block the transaction by disapproving Raider's indirect acquisition
of a twenty-five percent interest in Lifeline. The logic would be the
same as in Hoylake-Congress authorized the states to regulate "the
business of insurance."158 By posing a threat to policyholders, mergers
affect the business of insurance. States may, therefore, block mergers
which pose a threat to policyholders.
Such a response to the above hypothetical would be manifestly
unreasonable. Any interest the U.S. might have in blocking the acquisi-
tion of stock in Lifeline is outweighed by the foreign country's interest in
regulating its own securities market, Raider's interest in a profitable
takeover, and the interest of Spuds' shareholders in a potentially profita-
ble stock sale. Moreover, assuming that Raider tendered its offer for
Spuds in violation of the state's insurance holding company statute, the
U.S. would look foolish should the state try to enforce its law. Presuma-
bly the aggrieved foreign nation would not enforce a judgment against
assets located in its jurisdiction. Thus, the insurance commissioner's
only conceivable means of enforcement would be to attach Lifeline's
assets. The state presumably could not attach or levy upon the seventy-
five percent of Lifeline owned by entities not connected with Raider.
The state might be able to attach Raider's stock, but not if doing so
would harm the policyholders. 159 Assuming that the aggrieved Raider
would feel the sting of such a sanction, it is hard to imagine Raider's
home country not vigorously protesting the state's action. The U.S.,
and not just the state involved, might pay the price for the state's actions
in the form of foreign retaliation. Thus, the exercise of jurisdiction in
the Spuds' takeover would be unworkable and risky, as well as
unreasonable.
Given the above hypothetical and the interests involved in the Hoy-
lake tender offer, courts must somehow account for the ramifications of
applying state insurance legislation to block foreign mergers. The les-
sons from antitrust law form a useful starting point.
158. See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
159. The McCarran-Ferguson Act only authorizes the states to protect policyhold-
ers' interests. See supra note 51. Any actions which would harm the insurance com-
pany, and therefore its policyholders, are without federal authorization and are
constitutionally infirm under the commerce clause.
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C. Application of the Timberlane/Restatement Balancing Test to the
Hoylake Facts
This section will apply the Draft Restatement' 60 balancing test culled
from Timberlane 161 to the Hoylake facts and assess the efficacy of the test
in the context of state insurance statutes used to regulate foreign take-
over battles.
1. The Degree of Conflict with Foreign Law or Policy
When Hoylake initiated its bid to take over BAT, U.S. state laws
designed to protect insurance policyholders conflicted with the City
Code of Britain, a delicate, governmentally sanctioned means of regulat-
ing tender offers.' 6 2 The City Code requires that takeovers be con-
ducted within sixty days, 163 whereas the state takeover statutes extend
the time frame. The lengthy procedings required by U.S. state law jeop-
ardized Britain's prohibition against "frustrating activity."' 164 Ulti-
mately, application of U.S. law may have eclipsed the heart of the British
scheme, which is intended to enable the target shareholders to weigh
the offer on its merits. The high degree of conflict with British policy
should have weighed heavily against the application of the state insur-
ance holding company statutes.
2. The Nationality or Allegiance of the Parties and the Location or Principal
Places of Business of Corporations
The parties to the underlying transaction were British, Hoylake and the
huge conglomerate, BAT, suggesting that Britain has a paramount inter-
est in regulation. Other non-parties were affected by the transaction as
well, of course, chiefly insurance policyholders residing in the U.S. The
state insurance commissioners seek to protect their interests by prevent-
ing Hoylake from liquidating the insurance companies. Because the
Hoylake transaction impacts upon both British and American interests,
the nationality of the parties did not dearly weigh in favor of the applica-
tion of either British or U.S. law.
3. The Extent to Which Enforcement by Either State Can Be Expected to
Achieve Compliance
Apparently, the British Takeover Panel believed the U.S. had the power
to enforce its regulatory scheme or it likely would not have backed
down. But, consider what would have happened had the Takeover
Panel not bowed to U.S. state insurance law. By statute, state insurance
commissioners must protect the interests of state policyholders.' 65
Thus, they presumably could not impose sanctions that would harm the
160. See supra note 140.
161. See supra notes 129-31 and accompanying text.
162. See supra text accompanying notes 23-39.
163. See CrrY CODE, supra note 2, at M4.
164. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
165. See supra note 51.
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company and thereby necessarily jeopardize policyholders' interests.
Therefore, although courts could arguably grant the state commission-
ers authority to place the company in receivership pending sale to an
approved outside party, for example, use of such an extraordinary rem-
edy is both unlikely and, undoubtedly, extra-statutory.' 66 Weaker reme-
dies would not have prevented Hoylake from going ahead with its plans.
Thus, had the Takeover Panel not backed down, the state insurance
commissioners would have been hard-pressed to enforce their statutes
against Hoylake. The lack of pre-acquisition remedies suggests that the
courts should have considered Hoylake's contention that the state com-
missioners could more effectively police changes in the structure of
Farmers after Hoylake took control. 16 7
4. The Relative Significance of Effects in the U.S. to Those Abroad
The Hoylake bid required balancing disparate interests in the U.S. and
abroad. States have a strong interest in protecting insurance policyhold-
ers who depend on the stability of their insurance company for both
psychological and financial security. Should Hoylake somehow have
destroyed Farmers, British interests would not suffer.
In Britain, however, the Hoylake bid would have had significant
impact on the economy. In the aggregate, Farmers Group Insurance
Company comprises less than one-fourth of the value of BAT's
shares.' 6 8 Thus, the financial effects in the U.S., although significant,
were relatively small compared to those in Britain. The difficulties
posed by the balancing of unlike interests render this factor
inconclusive.
5. The Extent to Which the Activity i) Takes Place within the Regulating State
or ii) Has Substantial, Direct, and Foreseeable Effects upon or in the
Regulating State
This factor begs the question. The tender offer, made in Britain, sub-
stantially affected the British economy. On the other hand, Farmers
runs insurance companies in the nine states involved; therefore, the
potential effect in each state was both foreseeable and direct. This fac-
tor suggests both that the nine states should regulate the insurance com-
panies to ensure their integrity and that Britain should regulate the
merger to protect British interests. Although Hoylake mentioned this
166. The sanctions imposed under the statutes for making a tender offer without
prior approval of the Insurance Commissioners typically are minor. See, e.g., ARIZ.
REv. STAT. ANN. § 20-3311 (1990) (maximum fine for violation is $20,000; other
sanctions include revocation of license to practice insurance in that state).
167. See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
168. Axa-Midi offered 2.8 billion pounds ($4.5 billion) for Farmers Insurance
Group. Hoylake's total bid for BAT was 13.4 billion pounds. Even assuming that
Hoylake grossly undervalued Farmers in its effort to cement a deal, Farmers consti-
tutes but a minor portion of BAT's worldwide holdings. See The Times (London),
Aug. 25, 1989, at 19, col. 1.
Vol, 24
1991 Extraterritorial Reach of State Insurance Statutes
possibility in its briefs, the district courts failed to consider it.1 69
6. Connections, Such as Nationality, Residence, or Economic Activity, between
the Regulating State and the Persons Principally Responsible for the
Regulated Activity
The persons principally responsible for the potential takeover of BAT,
and thus indirectly of Farmers, were the tender-offerors. As Hoylake
and BAT were both British entities, 170 their strongest connections were
with Britain. Additionally, Hoylake and the bulk of BAT shareholders
were subject to British law. The connection with the U.S., derived from
the shareholders' interest in Farmers, was relatively incidental. Thus,
this factor favored British control.
D. The Efficacy of the Timberlane/Restatement Test in the Hoylake
Setting
Although the preceding analysis suggests restraint in the application of
state insurance laws, this result is by no means obvious. Factors sug-
gesting restraint are 1) the strong conflict with British policy; 2) the
potential enforcement problems had Hoylake violated the state statutes;
and 3) the greater connections of the principal actors with Britain. The
district courts should thus have conceded the difficulty of the cases
before them and examined Hoylake's suggestion that existing statutes
afforded a narrowly tailored remedy for the states. 171 By refusing to
consider these factors, the courts glossed over the conflict between the
state laws and important British regulatory objectives. 172
The other three factors considered were inconclusive.' 73 This
result is not surprising, however, because these factors attempt to com-
pare foreign economic interests with the qualitatively distinct domestic
interest in protecting resident policyholders. In light of the McCarran-
Ferguson Act, a U.S. judge is likely to apply state law by weighing the
security of the state insurance policyholders heavily. When no real
impact on U.S. policyholders occurs, however, the balance will favor the
application of foreign law. Conversely, when the application of U.S. law
does not threaten foreign interests, the balancing factors will support
application of state laws.
The Timberlane/Restatement balance yields clear results in a variety
of situations. For example, the Spuds hypothetical presents a scenario
169. See supra note 75. The feasibility of such an arrangement under current state
law is beyond the scope of this Note. Use of the balancing test, however, might
encourage courts to construct non-confrontational remedies.
170. Hoylake, as a Bermudan company, is subject to British regulation.
171. See Hoylake Brief, supra note 12.
172. See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
173. The three factors are 1) the nationality or allegiance of the parties and the
location or principal places of business of corporations; 2) the relative significance of
effects in the U.S. as compared with those elsewhere; and 3) the extent to which the
activity i) takes place within the regulating state or ii) has substantial, direct, and
foreseeable effect upon or in the regulating state.
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in which the state interest is virtually non-existent while the conflict with
foreign law is substantial. Further, the state would likely be unable to
enforce its statute against Raider corporation. The balancing test,
therefore, clearly proscribes the application of the state insurance
statute.
Alternatively, the balancing test would dictate the application of
state law in some cases. Consider the facts of Hoylake, except assume
that the foreign country does not regulate mergers. The state's interest
in protecting insurance policyholders would remain, but would not con-
flict with any foreign policies or laws. In such a scenario, the test clearly
dictates application of state law.
The Timberlane/Restatement analysis better addresses competing
policy concerns than does the rigid application of state laws evinced by
the district courts' rulings on Hoylake's motions. The balancing test,
although no panacea, forces U.S. courts to consider foreign interests
and provides a mechanism for analyzing those concerns.
E. Possible Legislative Responses to the Hoylake Problem
While the Timberlane/Restatement test may produce clear answers in
some situations, its application will be uncertain in difficult cases like
Hoylake, where a strong state interest conflicts with a strong foreign reg-
ulatory policy. In such close cases, a legislative response would undoubt-
edly be more effective.
At least two different types of legislation are possible. 174 As men-
tioned previously, states could effectively protect resident policyholders'
interests' after the merger has been effectuated' 7 5 through statutes
granting state insurance commissioners broad monitoring powers and
sanctions. 176 For example, such a statute could require state approval
of any change in the capitalization of insurance companies or any other
change that might adversely affect the policyholder. The state could also
impose stiff criminal and civil sanctions, 177 and in the case of particu-
larly egregious violations, the state could assume control of the insur-
ance company and sell it to a suitable party. When the offending
foreign company owned a controlling interest in an insurance company,
sanctions would likely work because that company would have both sub-
stantial assets within the state subject to attachment and managers
174. A third legislative approach-the creation of a federal body with exclusive
authority to regulate foreign mergers indirectly affecting the U.S.-is beyond the
scope of this Note.
175. See Hoylake Brief, supra note 12 and accompanying text.
176. For the purpose of this Note it makes no difference whether the Commission-
ers would always have these powers or have them only when a foreign firm acquired a
domestic U.S. insurance company.
177. Fines typically levied under state law are too small to adequately sting a mul-
tinational corporation. See, e.g., ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 20-3311 (1990) (maximum
fine of $20,000).
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located within the state subject to criminal sanctions. 178 Indeed, the
mere spectre of such sanctions would probably ensure compliance. By
regulating only those acts that directly impact policyholders, states
could protect local interests without impinging upon foreign regulatory
schemes and impeding international trade. However, this approach
would only be effective if a substantial number of states passed such reg-
ulatory legislation. 17 9 Absent a holding that the current approach is
unconstitutional or a federal law requiring states to avail themselves
solely of post-acquisition means of protecting policyholders' inter-
ests, 180 states are highly unlikely to alter current laws.
As an alternative to individual state action, Congress could create a
federal body to rule on proposed mergers of foreign corporations when
such mergers affect insurance companies doing business in the U.S.
Congress could begin by declaring that the McCarran-Ferguson Act
does not authorize states to block mergers of foreign corporations
merely because the target company controls insurance companies doing
business in the U.S.1 8 1 Congress could then grant exclusive authority to
regulate such mergers to a federal body with powers similar to those
currently held by the state commissioners.1 8 2 This body could govern
the merger's effects on U.S. insurance en toto.1 8 3 Moreover, Congress
could require that the body issue decisions quickly so as to accommo-
date foreign commercial transactions.
The congressional approach has two distinct advantages. It
requires no court action, 184 and it eliminates the repetitious regulatory
proceedings characteristic of a multi-state system. States that have tradi-
tionally regulated the insurance industry may oppose national legisla-
tion, but Congress could meet such opposition by appointing the
National Association of Insurance Commissioners, comprised of state
insurance commissioners, as the body empowered to decide on pro-
178. Under current law, the sanctions kick in when the tender offer is made without the
Insurance Commissioner's approval. The Commissioner could, therefore, theoreti-
cally attempt to enforce against a foreign entity that has yet to do any business in the
U.S. In such a situation, there would be nothing and no one to enforce against.
179. If only a few states passed such legislation, the Hoylake scenario would not be
prevented. Moreover, foreign corporations could acquire control of a U.S. insurance
holding company to deter takeovers.
180. Such a law might read: "The McCarran-Ferguson Act does not authorize
states to regulate mergers involving foreign target corporations simply because they
are indirectly engaged in the U.S. insurance business. States may regulate the post-
acquisition of such insurance companies to the fullest extent possible under current
or future state legislation." It seems bizarre that Congress would recognize the
problem, yet so blatantly pass the buck to the states.
181. The McCarran-Ferguson Act is silent on this matter. See 15 U.S.C. § 1011-15
(1988).
182. See supra notes 52-60 and accompanying text.
183. Given the foreign concerns at issue, it might be advisable that Congress
require such approval only when a threshold 51% ownership of the insurance com-
pany is effectuated. Current state statutes typically are triggered when a 25% interest
is acquired.
184. The foreign commerce clause clearly gives Congress power to legislate in this
area. See U.S. CONsT. art I, § 8, c 3.
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posed mergers implicating U.S. insurance companies. Because this
body already exists, its use at the federal level would be relatively inex-
pensive and would assure states that their interests would be protected.
Both the multi-state and the federal approach would alleviate fric-
tion with foreign regulatory schemes and promote international com-
merce. No such legislation, however, is currently pending.
Conclusion
By focusing upon domestic concerns, U.S. courts neglected important
international interests and allowed U.S. state insurance law to derail a
British tender offer for a British company which was in full compliance
with British regulations. These courts failed to respect both Britain's
sovereignty and its interest in regulating transactions occurring within
its borders. Moreover, the infeasibility of individual American states
enforcing ajudgment against Hoylake was completely ignored. The dis-
trict courts adopted a myopic view, as if the issues presented were
merely a matter of federalism and only involved the power of states qua
states to regulate insurance companies within their borders.
Congress, in the exercise of its power under the foreign commerce
clause, could by statute best address the problem of multi-state takeover
regulation in the transnational economic setting. Alternatively, by
granting tougher post-acquisition powers to state insurance commis-
sioners, states could provide a smoother multi-state system that would
not impinge upon foreign regulatory interests. Absent national or
multi-state action, U.S. courts must consider foreign economic and dip-
lomatic interests when deciding whether U.S. jurisdiction is appropriate.
In the antitrust area, courts have used a balancing approach to address
analogous concerns. A form of that test could be applied to the Hoylake
facts. Although the results of the test are not completely conclusive on
the Hoylake facts, they certainly counsel restraint in the exercise of U.S.
jurisdiction.
Strict application of state insurance holding company legislation
can lead to absurd and dangerous results. While the balancing test is far
from perfect, it should at least prevent application of U.S. law when its
application would be outrageous and unworkable. Consideration of all
of the interests involved is far preferable to the superficial and poten-
tially dangerous approach adopted by the district courts.
Andrew Volk
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